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INTRODUCTION
The commentator on modern legislation suffers from many handi-
caps all of which stem from the increasing difficulty experienced in
placing legislation in its correct perspective. To portray with accuracy
the contribution made to our well-being by many statutes is no simple
task; it is fraught with difficulty. For example, the overtones in con-
gressional or parliamentary debates, prior to the adoption of a particu-
lar measure, possess a significance which only the most skilled and
discerning of political interpreters are in a position to comprehend.
Moreover, what the commentator puts into print stands to suffer from
those who are able to write on the same legislation years later when
controversy has been erased and when the conflict between what was
intended by, and what have been the results of, the legislation has
invariably been resolved in favor of the latter.
These misgivings have long been sensed; but today, when the
elements in society are as diverse as ever and when the process of
societal interaction has been accelerated, they must necessarily be ac-
centuated. It is probable that a brief acquaintance with a few truths
is all that our writer is permitted to experience and that that is all he
can communicate. Silence is not a possible alternative, perhaps rather
unfortunately so, because then, at least, no positive errors would be
committed.
We are left, therefore, with the necessity of communication, the
aim of ensuring that that communication is as close to the objective
truth as possible and, finally, the hope that critics will not launch into
an attack on the content of our remarks unmindful of the handicap
from which we suffer.
One can, in un-Bunyan fashion, choose an easier path: simply
record the legislature's debate, discuss the actual statute, examine the
decided cases and leave it at that. But, even in such a straightforward
approach to legislation and its significance there looms the danger that
the very quality of the exposition, perhaps its flat and unexcited tones,
will betray an insensitivity towards an important detail that does
stand in need of emphasis. The orientation of this approach may be
quite wrong and, furthermore, misleading. It follows, therefore, that
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Tulane University.
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assessing the situational value of any piece of legislation is not to be
undertaken with a light heart.
With how much more trepidation must one approach a statute
such as the British Restrictive Practices Act, 1956,1 a novelty among
recent British legislation for its establishment of a new court of law
charged with grave responsibilities in the sphere of economics! This
peculiarly British effort to control cartels falls clearly into that branch
of the law school curriculum called "Public Control of Business"; 2
we are at once hurled into a confused world where politics, economics
and law are inextricably interwoven, perpetually in conflict and in-
describably complex.
Logically and, in each individual's case, intuitively, such a statute
conjures up a host of varying thought-responses; our whims of curiosity
are inevitably aroused, for here the dynamic variables of politics, law
and economics demand our attention. Their interdependency, however,
makes it almost a superhuman task to sift from the wilderness of our
intellectual impressions those that tell "what the Act is really all
about." Let us give an illustration of this predicament in which we
are placed. An important element of any inquiry into "what anything
is all about" is prediction of the future, or, at least, the pronouncement
of some homily which relies heavily on expected developments for the
justification of its moral message. This is quite natural. Yet such a
quest is pregnant with complications, for "if there is such a thing as
growing human knowledge, then we cannot anticipate today what we
shall know only tomorrow."' Prediction both of legal decisions and of
the effectiveness of legislation must be constantly subjected to this
appraisal.
At this stage the question may be raised, Why all these pre-
liminaries? It is well put. The answer is not simple, but is, in the
instance of the 1956 Act, induced by the conviction that it must have
been impossible to assess the situational value of the legislation in the
year it was introduced and by the continuing conviction that it is still
difficult to make that assessment even today. Perhaps it would be as
well if, at this stage of the argument, we were to make it plain in what
area these difficulties lie. One has to concede that the crucial proposi-
tion is the attachment of the British economy to a competition ethic
of some kind or other; but, it is far from certain (a) what this attach-
ment is; (b) what is meant by "competition" and what the ethic is;
1 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68.
2 The writer is referring to the American law school curriculum.
3 Popper, The Poverty of Historicism at vi. (1961 ed.).
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and (c) what the Restrictive Practices Act or, for that matter, the
earlier Monopolies Act of 19484 has to do with the problem.
To illustrate this thesis, one need only draw attention to the fact
that it is far from clear (1) what was the intention of the Government
in introducing the measure; (2) what the wording of the Act was
designed to effectuate; and (3) how to delineate satisfactorily the
Restrictive Practices Court's conception of its mission.
The clue to these several mysteries is not impossible to light
upon. Whither that clue will lead us is another matter altogether; for
it is at this later stage of our intellectual journey that real controversy
arises. Now the clue is provided by an appreciation of what the con-
cept of competition means in Britain which, in turn, requires an aware-
ness of the unique peculiarities of Britain's post-war economy and
of the various endeavors on the' part of British people to try to im-
prove their economic position.
Enough has now been said to put anyone on guard against re-
interpreting the British problem of restrictive trading practices and
the solution that Britain has sought to achieve in terms with which
he is more familiar; it would, for example, be particularly fatal to
compare, without more, the 1956 Act with the various measures in
the United States introduced to protect and foster the ideal of com-
petition. To give one example, the criterion of illegality of restrictive
practices is framed in quite different language in the British legisla-
tion;' to give a second, the excuses that may be offered in mitigation
of restriction are a peculiar combination, of British economic policies
both determinate and indeterminate.6 A not dissimilar combination
is to be found in the 1948 Act7 already referred to, but nothing re-
sembling it can be discovered in the pertinent American statutes.
Further discrepancies will be noted below; meanwhile, it will suffice
to quote the words of a member of the British cabinet on the not
unrelated subject of the British approach towards the monopoly
problem:
If we [i.e., the United Kingdom] join the Common Market we
may have to make certain changes in our monopolies legislation.
Broadly, the approach to monopolies in the Treaty of Rome8 is,
like ours, the control of abuse of monopoly power rather than the
control of monopoly as such.8
4 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948, 11 & 12
Geo. 6, c. 66.
5 Section 21.
6 Section 21(1)(a) to (g).
7Section 14.
8 Article 86.
M r. Henry Brooke in the House of Commons. See The Times (London), Feb. 15,
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THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE ACT
So that we may better appreciate how stands "competition" in
Britain, though we risk being somewhat controversial, let us now
briefly examine the salient features of British post-war economic his-
tory. Materially exhausted but spiritually rehabilitated, a country
victorious in war is likely to accustom itself only with difficulty to its
comparative penury. In part, this explains what happened in Britain
at the close of World War II. An ungrudging acceptance of its military
commitments entailed a further drain on the already depleted national
resources and the commencement of the Cold War did nothing to
ease the situation. Heavy taxation was an almost inevitable con-
sequence; in one way or another, the result was a lower level of in-
vestment in Britain. Although Britain's welfare state which was
substantially enlarged by the post-war Labour Government is, in
several respects, less comprehensive than other welfare states in
Western Europe, it too had to be paid for. The rather sudden enact-
ment of tax legislation which had the effect of evening out income
differences probably contributed-though if it did, it need not neces-
sarily have done so-to a drying up of the sources of investment. For
this entire period the Government kept a tight grip on the economic
,destiny of the country; rationing of foodstuffs and clothes is the
feature of post-war Britain housewives remember best. Fear of inflation o
in a period of comparatively high employment provoked a variety of
counteracting policies such as that encouraging dividend limitation.
And then, of course, there was the omewhat more dramatic occurrence
known as nationalisation.
Objections to the failure of the Labour Government to create what
business considered to be the right psychological atmosphere for
economic expansion probably contributed to the Conservative Party's
victory at the polls in 1951. The present Government has, however,
been barely able to improve the overall position, though, of course,
materially the Britisher is better off today than he was in 1951.
Balance of payments crises have continued and more measures have
been resorted to in order to combat inflationary tendencies. These
problems remain.
In what way does this post-war drama impinge on Government
1962. Mr. Brooke's remarks occurred in the course of the debate on the Labour Party
motion: "That this House deplores the timid and complacent attitude of the Govern-
ment towards the growth of private monopoly in Great Britain and their refusal to
safeguard the public interest by instituting a public inquiry into the proposed merger
of Imperial Chemical Industries and Courtaulds." Both the Labour Party's motion and
the merger attempt by I.C.I. were defeated.
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policy towards monopoly and oligopoly? It is suggested that among
the following are some of the relevant points.
(1) The difficulty that the Socialists experienced in coming to
terms with a capitalist economy led them to adopt measures which
they thought would contribute to the economic good but which in-
dustry was reluctant or unwilling to believe would. This should explain
the existence of a certain uneasiness as the country moved into the
era of the mixed economy; there were fears that nationalisation would
become more widespread. This factor tended to put business on good
behavior.
(2) The classical aggressiveness of the capitalist was not com-
monly encountered whilst British industry recovered slowly from the
effects of war. Restriction and understandings within industry had
been encouraged by the devastating experience of the 1930's; they
were both required by the war and by the years of scarcity immediately
following.
(3) The caution shown once controls were removed indicated
that investment was not necessarily going to increase at a sufficiently
quick rate to enable the United Kingdom to compete effectivelr with
modern equipment in the revived world markets.
To sum up, the high degree of cultural unity in Britain in 1945
entailed that few persons, businessmen least of all, were going to
be seen to hurt other people's feelings. Such a situation poses a
dilemma for a society which is both intent on economic advance and,
despite superficial class barriers, egalitarian in outlook. Now that the
Conservatives have been attempting to create conditions where their
brand of expansion can take place, the country has not been able
to make the correct adjustment or, at least, to adjust at a satisfactory
rate.
Given the complex nature of British society, it was to be ex-
pected that, when a government was tempted to have recourse to
legislation to boost national economic achievement, that government
would not identify itself too closely with an ethic, such as competi-
tion, without making due allowances for political desires manifestly
inconsistent with that ethic. This is, perhaps, the most important
general caveat that requires to be lodged in connection with British
policy towards monopoly and restrictive trading practices. It illustrates
the workings of British political pragmatism and is in the tradition of
empiricist philosophy. Some may scorn such Fabian tactics,10 shout
10 Fabian tactics here, of course, refer to the policies made famous by the Roman
statesman, Quintus Fabius Maximus, and not to any of the ideas promulgated by G. B.
Shaw and his entourage.
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"Britain needs more competition quickly," and label present tactics
"defeatist"; yet, as one writer has recently commented-surely cor-
rectly:
The British capacity to muddle through reflects a national distaste
for root and branch change, grounded in an intuition of the com-
plexity of truth and the necessity for considering any changes
which may be proposed in terms of realities rather than of abstrac-
tions.'.
Furthermore, any critic of British policy should bear in mind that
the price of a mistake in that policy in Britain is very great, as the
author of "American Capitalism, The Concept of Countervailing
Power" has admirably demonstrated:
[O]ne of the profound sources of American strength has been the
margin for error provided by our well-being. In the United King-
dom, especially in modern times, there has been little latitude for
mistakes. Government management of economic affairs has had,
accordingly, to be far more precise than it has ever been with us.
An average Congress occupying the House of Commons and func-
tioning in accustomed fashion would, on numerous recent occasions,
haive brought about a fairly prompt liquidation of what remains of
the British Empire.' 2
The extent to which these philosophical and political grounds for
caution can be adjudged correct should be borne in mind as we enter
into a consideration of the operation and force of the 1956 British
Act. This, naturally, requires personal decisions as to what is con-
sidered desirable for Britain. Change, yes, but what kind of change?
And how is it to be brought about?
In order that it may be easier for a foreign student of Britain's
monopoly and restrictive practices laws to appreciate the importance
of these preliminary observations, let us now refer to views of the
Government, the public and industry on matters which relate, with
varying degrees of directness, to Britain's competition laws.
First, there are the words of a member of the Government:
Britain's need today as a commercial nation is a mood of
brash, almost Victorian, self-confidence .... Too long the associa-
tions of employers and employed have put the main emphasis on
protection and security, fighting against competition, lest the
weaker go to the wall, fighting against redundancy, as though a man
who lost one job should not expect to find a better one. What we
need is more opportunity, not more security; open doors to the entry
11 Goyder, The Responsible Company 11 (1961).
12 Galbraith, American Capitalism, The Concept of Countervailing Power 106
(Sentry ed., 1962).
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of our own competition, not shelter against the competition of
others.13
Second, there is what the consumer feels. Two separate areas of
economic controversy have been chosen. The Lloyd Jacob Committee
on Resale Price Maintenance 14 reporting in 1948 made a special effort
to discover what shoppers thought about fixed retail prices. These
shoppers were reported to have said:
In the normal shopping round it is a convenience to know in ad-
vance what an item or group of items would cost and that it made
it easier to plan and check household expenditure.' 5
Of the attitude of the public towards the future of the state-run
British railways, a newspaper columnist had this criticism to make:
It must be admitted that the modern State encourages this divorce
of price from cost. The nationalised industries are set up with the
injunction to provide an economic, efficient, adequate and properly
co-ordinated service. These adjectives open the way to a real free-
for-all .... Of course, if a public service is supplying people at a
loss you can say it is not economic, you can even say it is not
efficient. But if the railways shut down an unremunerative branch
line you can say it is not providing an adequate service as long as
some people want to use it or even may in the future want to use
it.16
Both the Government and the consumer are deeply affected by
their rational desires for economic stability, adequacy of supply and
efficiency. When these conflict, as they often do, and when it is seen
that they conflict, the awful contradictions and noble paradoxes of
British society are exposed for all to see.
Viscount Chandos, the chairman of Associated Electrical Indus-
tries, has recently injected into these social and economic debates, a
view-undoubtedly shared by a substantial number of British business-
13 Mr. Enoch Powell. See The Sunday Times (London), May 13, 1962.
14 Cmd. No. 7696 (1948).
15 The future of individual resale price maintenance is extremely uncertain
in Britain at present. There are persistent rumors that the Government intends to
proscribe it. See The Sunday Times (London), May 27, 1962. The debate on the
subject has been a long one. There are two recent Government reports on the subject:
Cmd. No. 7696 (1948) and Cmd. No. 9504 (1956). Change in the law was brought
about by the Restrictive Practices Act, infra. Fuel to the flames of controversy has
recently been added by Andrews and Friday's rejoinder to B. S. Yamey's pro-abolition
paper, Resale Price Maintenance and Shopper's Choice (Hobart Papers, Institute of
Economic Affairs, 1960). The reply is P. W. S. Andrews and Frank A. Friday, Fair
Trade: Resale Price Maintenance Re-examined (1960).
16 Schwartz, "To Achieve the Larger Social Purpose," The Sunday Times (London),
May 13, 1962.
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men-that the moral leaders in industry set the stamp of their approval
on price leadership rather than the cloister (by which he means secret
price-fixing) or the jungle (by which he means cut-throat competi-
tion) .17
It would not be easy to say what the view of the Government
is on an oligopolistic concentration situation where price leadership
flourishes; yet, this new problem adds an extra dimension to the
perspective from which we view the British response to the call for
more competition, and it is as important that it should be remembered
as it is the views on resale price maintenance or the future of the
railways"8 when we turn to examine the Act itself.
THE QUEST FOR THE SITUATIONAL VALUE OF THE ACT
1. The Perils of the Conventional Wisdom
Now that we have indicated in broad outline the methodological
and political hazards in impressing the correct situational value on
modern economic legislation, i.e., labelling it with the right label, let
us turn our attention to the more specific problems of this general
type to be considered in connection with the 1956 Act.
First, it is necessary to say a little more about our search for
situational value. Anyone today who pursues a search for significance
must recognise that the logical assumptions under which he labors
may not be duplicated in those persons responsible for the functioning
of the institution he is examining. This is surely the point well brought
out by that brilliant ex-lawyer, Franz Kafka, in his novel The Trial.
The use of ordinary rational faculties is, in such a situation, of
no avail since the observer and the observed do not understand each
other; they do not communicate in the same language. It is quite
17 "Lords of the Cloister," The Economist (London), April 21, 1962.
18 It may be of some interest to point out that there is fairly clear evidence that
the Government has decided that state-run industries must become self-supporting in
those cases where they at present are not. If they are already making profits, these are
to be increased in order to defray general governmental expenditure. One can point to
the following indicia of change:
(a) The railways. Uneconomic lines are being closed down; moreover, a recent
statement from the head of the British Transport Commission suggests that
stopping trains outside the commuter range are likely to be reduced and un-
economic freight carriage curtailed.
(b) The post office. Over the whole country in the coming years, the post office will
introduce a system already in operation in some areas, whereby local telephone
calls are charged on a time basis.
(The British telephone system is operated by the post office.)
On the introduction into nationalised industries of what may be described as more
aggressive "free enterprise" managerial tactics, see Robson, Nationalised Industry and
Public Ownership (1960), especially the chapter, "Competition and Monopoly."
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possible that the fault does not lie with those being observed; it may
well be that the totality of the situation is of such a nature that a
search for a "logical" explanation of it is out of place.
Ever since western man became familiar with the advantages to
be gained from the projection of political symbols, the innocent's
quest for their meaning has been ill-starred. They invariably do not
represent what the gullible think they represent. This is no doubt
true of meetings attended by important persons and held to discuss
economic prosperity at a time when that prosperity is threatened. It
may appear to the public that the meeting has been called solely in
order to agree on the measures most suited to the exigencies of the
moment. However, it is more than likely that the real purpose of the
meeting has not been to achieve something concrete but rather so that
people can see that a meeting has been held, i.e., that the Govern-
ment, business or the unions are aware of the pressing need for solu-
tions and are mindful of their obligations to the country.19
Thurman Arnold has made full use of his awareness of these
traps when he wrote, in the right tones of cynicism, of the antitrust
laws of the United States:
The antitrust laws became the great myth to prove by an oc-
casional legal ceremony that great industrial organizations should
be treated like individuals, and guided by principle and precept
back to the old ways of competition and fair practices, as individu-
als were. This was then, and is today, the principle utility of that
massive moral philosophy known as antitrust legislation.20
Arnold's view may now be discredited in the United States; 2 his
later role as a forceful administrator of those selfsame laws suggests
it ought to be. But, irrespective of this, what of the 1956 British Act?
Is it nothing but a beguiling piece of ceremony, part of the folklore of
the British mixed economy?
19 This example is suggested by remarks of J. K. Galbraith in ch. VIII, Aftermath
I, in his book, The Great Crash 1929 (1954).
20 Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism 221 (1937).
21 This complaint of Engels would presumably be answered too:
In a modern state, law must not only correspond to the general economic
position and be its expression, but must also be an expression which is consistent
in itself, and which does not, owing to inner contradictions, look glaringly in-
consistent. And, in order to achieve this, the faithful reflection of economic
conditions is more and more impinged upon. All the more so, the more rarely it
happens that a code of law is the bold, unmitigated, unadulterated expression of
the domination of a class-this in itself would already offend the "conception of
justice."
Quoted Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in The Corporation in
Modern Society 29 (Mason ed. 1960).
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The answer surely is "no."
In the first place, it is impossible to. conceive of interruptions in
the operation of the laws-a factor contributing largely to Arnold's
youthful doubts.
Secondly, the British attachment to the ideal of control of abuse
of power rather than control of power as such surely makes it plain
that there is less likelihood of a conflict between what in an economic
sense needs to be done and what it is considered by people as a whole
should be done. The argument is this. If we seek to control power,
we are more likely to be deflected from our proper task of promoting
economic health and national well-being by the shibboleths of those
who have, in the past, suffered from the exercise of that power but
who are, perhaps, not fully acquainted with the change in the charac-
ter and extent of that power as the economy grows, as society changes.
Thirdly, the Government clearly hoped that the Act would
promote competition. The preamble to the statute provides sufficient
evidence of this:
An Act to provide for the registration and judicial investiga-
tion of certain restrictive trading agreements, and for the prohibi-
tion of such agreements when found contrary to the public inter-
est; to prohibit the collective enforcement of conditions regulating
the resale price of goods....
In the fourth place, the effect of some of the early decisions of
the court has been such as to lead to the voluntary abandonment by
businessmen of their registered restrictive agreements. Though the
Registrar in his latest report22 concedes that the rate of abandonments
has declined, settlements outside the courtroom have contributed to
the paucity of decided cases from the period September 1961-June
1962. This indicates that businessmen are certainly not treating the
Act lightly; it is reasonable to suppose that this is the state of mind
which the Government wished to foster.
In one sense, however, the cynic cannot be fully answered. We
have tried to show that the Act is more than a sham and that it has
significance in that it has produced effects, but it is perfectly legitimate
for someone to complain that "significance" means more than a
conglomeration of human actions induced by legislation. They are
quite right. Part of the reason why we are induced to say anything is
"significant" is that we are convinced that it indicates a step in the
right direction. For the word "significant" does more than describe
the word to which it is grammatically attached; it may involve the
22Report of the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Practices covering the period from
Jan. 1, 1960 to June 30, 1961, Cmd. No. 1603 (1962).
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attribution of moral approval. The point is that we cannot be certain
that the effects produced by the Restrictive Practices Act are the right
effects. Some, for instance, believe that written agreements have been
replaced by the perhaps more pernicious tacit understanding. The
Registrar of Restrictive Practices can be counted amongst those of
this opinion.23 Yet others believe that the Act has accelerated a trend
towards monopoly in British industry. Both views have contributed
to the decision of the President of the Board of Trade to review
the working of both the 1948 and 1956 Acts. "This review," declared
Mr. Erroll, "will naturally have to cover the growth in recent years
in the number of mergers and the implications of this development for
the future health of the economy."
24
2. The Act From the Standpoints of Government, Business and Law
Our classification of the legislation as falling within the area of
"Public Control of Business" invites us to consider it from the three
standpoints of Government, business and the law. The enactment of
the legislation certainly inaugurated something of a revolution; it is
an example of something more than piecemeal technology. In what
manner, then, did the change manifest itself?
First, the passing of the Act was symptomatic of the added in-
terest of the Government, albeit a Conservative one, in the workings
of the British capitalist system. Nevertheless, this change was less
revolutionary than it would have been, say, forty years ago. Britain
has, after all, several nationalised industries and has, in recent months,
established a National Economic Development Council; both of these
innovations would have been anathema to Victorian or early twentieth
century Conservatives. Concern at the inability of industry to shake
itself free both of its depression psychosis and its restrictionist bent in
the face of the need for it to develop growth at home partly for the
purpose of expanding exports, together with an increasing awareness
of the scope and effects of restrictive practices as revealed by the
important report of the Monopolies Commission of 195521 led the
Government to take strong action.
From the standpoint of industry, the 1956 Act was naturally
somewhat dramatic, but it should be borne in mind that private in-
dustry had been subjected to fairly close scrutiny under the Labour
Government. Fears that the wielding of monopoly power in some in-
23 Ibid.
24 The Times (London), Jan. 31, 1962.
25 The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Collective Discrimination:
A Report on Exclusive Dealing, Collective Boycotts, Aggregated Rebates and Other
Discriminatory Trade Practices, Cmd. No. 9504 (1955).
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dustries would lead to artificially low production and thus obstruct
full employment2 6 partly contributed to the first post-war legislation
which, in a more direct way than ordinary Government policies would
allow, regulated the affairs of private businessmen. This was the
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act,
1948.
This legislation has significance in another sense. The Labour
Party was then and still is officially committed to a policy of acquiring
the means of production of industry, now usually referred to more
genteely as "the commanding heights of the economy." This Act of
1948 thus appears as the manifestation of a compromise by a Govern-
ment with an economic order of things in which that government did
not believe but which that government at that time could not or would
not replace. As G. D. H. Cole rationalised this unique situation, no
matter how hostile in principle the Socialist remains towards capitalism,
he cannot, if he is a "gradualist," wish it not to prosper when he is not
prepared to take it over.28
The statute established a commission to investigate, not on its
own behalf but at the instigation of the Board of Trade, situations
where it was thought that one-third of a market had been captured
by one industrial bloc, to recommend steps to be taken to end any
threat to the public interest thereby disclosed, and also to draw up
reports on associated economic matters. No complete definition of the
public interest appeared in the 1948 Act but guidance was given as to
the economic objectives which were to be considered as in the public
interest. These included production, treatment and distribution by the
most efficient and economic means; progressive increases in efficiency;
the encouragement of new enterprise; full use of men, materials and
capacity; technical improvements; the expansion of old and the
opening of new markets.29 The Act gives the Board of Trade authority
to make orders incorporating any recommendations the Commission
might make, but it should be emphasised that under the present law
the Board is not bound to accept these recommendations.
By way of contrast, the 1956 Act is a more determined effort to
improve the state of industry and it certainly concerns a larger area
of the economy. Though it may have seemed to business that the 1956
Act was a naive or disingenuous attempt to discipline the matured
26 These fears were shown to be specious. See Jewkes, "British Monopoly Policy
1944-56," 1 J.L. and E. 1, 2 (1958).
27 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66.
28 Cole, "The Growth of Socialism," in Law and Opinion in England in the
Twentieth Century 79, 89 (Ginsberg ed. 1959).
21 Section 14.
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adult, reactions were in fact mixed, and many distinctly favorable. It
would possibly be a fair comment that it rather depended on how
much the individual businessman had to fear. Still, sincere fears have
continued to be expressed that the small man will be gradually forced
out as a result of the introduction of such a measure.
Since the first cases under the Act were decided, there has been
little official business comment. More recently the remarks of Mr. Paul
Chambers during I.C.I.'s unsuccessful plan to acquire Courtauld's,
and the comments of Viscount Chandos which appear elsewhere in
this article, indicate a revival of concern in the relationship between
law and monopolies and restrictive trade practices. On the whole, ac-
ceptance of the philosophy of "competition" has been aided by the
encounter with the "bracing cold shower" of European competition.
Conflict of interest within business is still obvious; most clearly
is this so in relation to the compromise law on resale price maintenance
enacted by the 1956 statute.3 Under the new law, agreements for the
collective enforcement of conditions as to resale prices have been
proscribed, but individual enforcement of resale prices is not only
sanctioned but is assisted by special legal penalties. In one of the
several cases that have reached the courts under this latter provision,
"Pete the Pirate" was still fined even though he said he was charging
less than the scheduled price for cigarettes because of a recent appeal
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to everyone to reduce prices. It
is rumored that vertical price maintenance may soon be ended.
For the lawyer, the 1956 Act is of considerable importance.
First, by the establishment of a new court of law to settle problems
which are essentially economic in character, the Government has
deliberately reversed the trend voluntarily set in motion early this
century by the judges themselves of abdicating as much responsibility
as they could in controversial social and economic spheres. As the
doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy began to be understood in all of
its ramifications, the judges took it upon themselves to disengage the
common law from the glare of controversy. The Taff Vale Case de-
cided in 1901,"' which was a decision of the House of Lords hostile to
trade unions had such profound repercussions-it had no small part
in the growth of the Labour Party-that, when the Liberal Govern-
ment reversed the case by statute in 1906,32 the judges have since
rarely announced a politically controversial decision. Of course, the
30 Sections 24-7.
31 Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amaig. Soc. of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 421.
32 Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47. This Act gave unions virtual im-
munity from tort actions.
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opportunity in the British system of government for such an event to
occur is rare.
The statute's delineation of the vague competition norm,33 what-
ever may be its ambiguities and uncertainties, is in marked contrast
to the now usually admitted unsatisfactory common law approach to
competition as that approach had finally been developed at the start
of the First World War. By then it had been decided that it was no
tortious conspiracy for businessmen to combine to injure another
businessman so long as their predominant motive was not malice but
the furtherance of their own economic well-being 34 and the means
adopted were not unlawful.35 Contemporaneously, it had been held that
a party to a restrictive trade practice could not successfully avow
that that practice was a contract in restraint of trade unless he proved
that the contract was not reasonable from the standpoint of the parties
themselves. 36 At an earlier stage of the development of the law on
restraint of trade, it had been laid down that the restriction must be
shown to be reasonable from the standpoint of both the parties and
the public.3 T By 1914, this dual standard of legality had been
abandoned.38
At this what-seems-to-us-unsatisfactory state of the law, the judi-
ciary at the turn of the century appears to have been but little
concerned. Lord Coleridge, C.J., refers to some misgivings others may
have felt. Touched, as this passage surely reveals, by the spirit of a
Herbert Spencer or a Graham Sumner, he, to his own satisfaction, re-
duces these misgivings to more gentle proportions:
In the hand to hand war of commerce, as in the conflicts of
public life, whether at the bar, in Parliament, in medicine, in engi-
neering .. . men fight without much thought of others, except a
desire to excel or to defeat them. Very lofty minds, like Sir Philip
Sidney, with his cup of water,39 will not stoop to take an advan-
83 Section 21.
34 Mogul S.S. Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. Ltd., [1892] A.C. 25.
35 Finally incorporated into the "conspiracy rubric" by Sorrell v. Smith, [1925]
A.C. 700.
36 N. W. Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co., [1914] A.C. 461.
3T Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535.
38 This was not true of the law on contracts in restraint of trade in areas other than
restrictive trading agreements.
39 Sir Philip Sidney was one of those legendary figures who enhanced the reign of
Elizabeth I. This poet and statesman met his death on the battle-field of Zutphen in the
fall of 1585. Resting at the English camp mortally wounded, he called for a drink,
being parched with thirst. A bottle of water was brought, but as he was placing it to his
lips, a grievously wounded footsoldier was borne past him and fixed greedy eyes on the
bottle. Sidney at once handed it to the dying man with the famous words: "Thy
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tage, if they think another wants more. Our age, in spite of high
authority to the contrary4° is not without its Sir Philip Sidneys;
but these are counsels of perfection which it would be silly indeed
to make the measure of the rough business of the world as pursued
by ordinary men of business. 41
The 1956 Act is a far cry from the philosophy of Social Darwinism.
There are two ways in which one can view the decision of the
Conservative Government to utilise the independent agency of the
law to promote "competition." On the one hand, the fervent admirer
of the law will welcome the decision to use it as an instrument of
social change.' On the other hand, the objections put forward at the
time by a former Labour Solicitor-General and now a High Court
judge call for an answer:
The function of a court is not that which is mentioned in the Bill;
it is entirely different, namely, to interpret and administer law, and
not to make it. The Bill hands over to this court governmental and
parliamentary power. All judgments are founded upon law or upon
facts, but in this case the decision which really matters will be a
decision founded neither upon law nor upon fact. It will be a
political and economic decision .... The true place of public inter-
est in law is as the foundation and reason for a general rule, which
the law then applies. It is not for a judge to conceive what, in all
the circumstances, he considers the public interest to be. This is not
law; it is the negation of law.43
Since the coming into force of the legislation, the judges have
been able to withdraw from this political controversy by their display
of integrity and of conscientiousness. Revelation of such traditional
qualities is not enough; one looks for dynamic understanding of the
problems the judges have to decide. In this connection it is valuable
to observe that the Restrictive Practices Court is something of an
experimental court, as laymen sit with High Court judges as members
of the Bench. And, out of consideration for their brethren on the
Bench, the judicial members have abandoned wig and gown for the
more mundane dark suit.
For Government, industry and the law, the 1956 Act is a distinct
innovation. The decisions of the court tell us what kind of an innova-
tion it has turned out to be. But before we go on to discuss the cases,
it is as well that we have in mind a synopsis of the content and the
operation of the Act.
necessity is yet greater than mine." Twenty-six days later Sidney was dead. See XVIII
Dictionary of National Biography 227.
40 It is not known to what authority Lord Coleridge was referring.
41 Mogul S.S. Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. Ltd., 21 Q.B.D. 544, 553 (1888).
42 See, for example, the speech of the Lord Chancellor, in 199 H.L. Deb. 350 (1956).
43 Speech of Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas, 549 H.C. Deb. 2029 (1956).
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SYNoPsIs OF THE ACT
The Act came into force on August 2, 1956. Its effect on the law
relating to resale price maintenance has already been mentioned; one
other important but subsidiary change wrought by the Act is the
amendment44 to the previous monopolies legislation.45 This involves
the reconstitution of the Monopolies Commission and the curtailment
in the scope of its inquiries in view of the 1956 Act.46
The Act inaugurates a system of registration of restrictive trading
agreements, 47 and sets up the Restrictive Practices Court 48 to consider
the validity of those agreements on the register when these are pre-
sented for their judgment by the Registrar.4 Failure by a person or
a trade association to forward to the Registrar particulars of a
registrable agreement may result in their being fined 100 pounds;5"
punishment by fine or imprisonment is laid down for offences in con-
nection with false statements.5'
The court is composed of High Court judges, appointed by the
Lord Chancellor 52 and also of persons "appearing to the Lord Chancel-
lor to be qualified by virtue of [their] knowledge of or experience in
industry, commerce or public affairs."53 There are five judges and not
more than ten laymen. The latter at present include a banker, an
accountant, a former civil servant, industrialists and trade unionists.54
Registereat agreements are presumed to be against the public in-
terest; those who seek to support them shoulder the burden of show-
ing that they are, in fact, beneficial on any one of seven stated grounds
and, further, that on balance, considering any disadvantage to the
public involved, they are not unreasonable. 5
44 By sections 28 to 31.
45 This includes, in addition to the 1948 Act, the Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices Commission Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 51.
46 There are areas where neither the court nor the commission control the
activities of business. For example, under present British law there is no power in any
authority to prevent a merger even though this may result in the emergence of a
monopoly.
47 Sections 1, 6 and 9.
48 Section 2.
49 Section 1(2).
50 Section 16(1).
51 Section 16(2).
52 Three English judges are appointed to the court by the Lord Chancellor; the
other two judges are appointed from the judiciaries of Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Section 3(1).
53 Section 4(1).
54 Boggis, "The Control of Monopoly," 12 Cartel 79, 80 (1962).
55 Section 21.
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Not all agreements of a restrictive nature are registrable.
Elaborate rules relating to excepted and exempted agreements are
laid down by sections 7 and 8 respectively. Important examples of
these special non-registrable agreements are agreements relating to
workmen and their hours of work,56 agreements relating exclusively
to the export of goods from the United Kingdom,57 schemes concerned
with the rationalisation of an industry and certified as such,rs and
finally sole agency agreements."9 It is important to stress that the Act
is only concerned with restrictive practices distorting supply, etc. in the
United Kingdom. 0 The function of determining whether or not an
agreement is registrable is reserved not for the Restrictive Practices
Court but for the High Court." The problems in this field are obvious.
In Re Austin Motor Co. Ltd.'s Agreements,62 the High Court refused to
look behind a system of bipartite agreements between manufacturers
and distributors and manufacturers and dealers of motor cars which
was, in 1956, substituted for a system of multipartite arrangements
that would clearly have been forbidden under the 1956 Act, even
though there was probably some truth in the Registrar's complaint
that the new agreements depended for their efficacy on mutual ar-
rangements among all concerned. On the other hand, the agreement in
Re Automatic Telephone and Electric Co. Ltd.'s Application63 was
held to be properly registrable. The agreement in this case involved
market sharing, but the striking thing about it was its connection
with a separate agreement to supply the post office with telephones.
The manufacturers argued that the forced registration of their sub-
sidiary agreement would in effect prejudice Crown rights which were
protected under the 1956 Act by virtue of the constitutional principle
that the Crown is not bound by a statute unless this is expressly
stated. The judge disagreed, saying Crown rights would not be jeop-
ardised.
Another matter bearing on the operation of the register has
recently been determined. The Restrictive Practices Court has held in
Re Newspaper Proprietors' Agreement64 that it does possess the juris-
diction to consider an agreement which is on the register even though
56 Section 7(4).
57 Section 3(8).
58 Section 8(2).
69 Section 8(3).
60 Section 6(1).
61 Section 13(2).
62 L.R. 1 R.P. 6 (1957).
63 [19621 1 Weekly L.R. 596; [1962] 2 All E.R. 207.
64 [1962] 1 Weekly L.R. 328; [1962] 2 All E.R. 250.
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that agreement was terminated by the parties to it before the court
was served with notice of a reference of that agreement by the
Registrar. In denying the application of the proprietors, the court
acted on pragmatic considerations:
Persons ... could agree common retail prices; then determine
the agreement within three months; then register the agreement;
then enter into a fresh agreement; then register the determination;
then determine the second agreement, and so on.65
Once the court finds an agreement to be contrary to the public
interest under section 21, a declaration to that effect is made. An
injunction to prevent continuing adherence to the restrictive scheme
does not follow automatically.6 The court has first to be convinced of
the real likelihood of a breach of the law.
The possibly unsatisfactory nature of this approach was indicated
in Re Newspaper Proprietors' Association's and National Federation
of Retail Newsagents', Booksellers' and Stationers' Agreement,6" where
the court after having announced its faith in the retail federation-
"The federation is a responsible body, its members are responsible
and law-abiding citizens" 68-- was forced to subject it to an injunction
on hearing that a new plan had been thought up to control entry into
the retail newspaper business. Diplock, J., added:
We also desire to make it crystal clear, since the object of the
scheme is plain, that the court will not regard as a mitigating cir-
cumstance the fact that any such person has acted on the advice
of lawyers .... 69
One other matter of post-judgment practice has recently been
settled. It has been held to be no contempt of the Restrictive Practices
Court for members of a trade association to purport to deprive of his
offices within that association a fellow member, who had given evi-
dence on behalf of the Registrar against an agreement to which the
association was a party, despite the fact that their sole motive was
malice.7 1
To complete this portrayal of the procedural aspects to the statute,
mention must be made of the power given to the Board of Trade to
remove from the register, on the representation of the Registrar, agree-
ments considered to be of no substantial economic significance. 71
65 [1962] 2 All E.R. 256.
66 In re Yarn Spinners' Agreement, L.R, 1 R.P. 118, 198 (1959).
67 L.R. 2 R.P. 453 (1961).
68 Id. at 495.
69 Id. at 499.
70 In re Attorney-General's Application, L.R. 3 R-P. 1 (1962), rev'd sub norn. At-
torney-General v. Butterworth, [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. 819; [1962] 3 All E.R. 326.
71 Section 12(1).
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A short comparison with United States law and practice should
serve to bring out some of the more salient features of the British
law.
(1) There is not, in Britain, the wide variety of methods avail-
able under the antitrust laws for advertising lapses from the competi-
tive norm; all must be decided within one Act.
(2) The system of registration finds no parallel in the United
States; a European, however, does not find the system so strange.
Registration is provided for under the regulations recently made
under the Treaty of Rome to outlaw agreements which have as their
object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion. The registration system would appear to have been first intro-
duced by Norway in 1926. The advantages of this method might be
expressed in the one word, "publicity."
(3) British law does not treat as criminal breaches of the restric-
tive practices legislation; instead, parties to an agreement may be
placed under an injunction if there is evidence of their intention to
continue to abide by that agreement after the court has declared it
to be against the public interest.
(4) British legislation does not subject monopolies to the same
procedure as it does restrictive agreements. Monopolies continue to
be investigated by an administrative body of few powers under the
1948 Act. Absence of comprehensive legislation regulating abuses of
market power is, naturally, of great significance.
(5) Again, the variety of agreements exempted from registration
including, for instance, sole agency agreements, illustrates the more
restricted notions of forbidden conduct under British law.
More important than any of the above differences is the actual
content of the substantive law; this is to be found in the decided cases.
SECTION TWENTY-ONE OF THE ACT
Before we examine the eighteen substantive decisions which have,
at the time of writing,72 been handed down, it is essential that we
append a brief word about the framework within which the adjudica-
tive faculties of the members of the court operate, i.e., the considera-
tions that they are to hold uppermost in the determination of cases.
This framework is provided by section 21, without doubt the most
important section in the whole Act. It will be observed below that
section 21 is remarkable not so much for what it contains, but for
what it does not contain. It says that all restrictions are presumed to
be contrary to the public interest unless it is shown that any of the
72 July, 1962.
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seven defenses is proved and also that, on balance, the interest of
the public is not thereby adversely affected. This sounds simple and
straightforward, but how mistaken an impression this is, for how can
one indulge in balancing social interests if there is no yardstick by
which to weigh those interests, if there is no definition of the public
interest?
This remarkable section must be reproduced in full, so important
is familiarity with its general pattern, its concepts and its pragmatic
assumptions to appreciate the magnitude of the problem set at the
beginning of this article, namely, to find the situational value of the
Act.
For the purposes of any proceedings before the Court under
the last foregoing section, a restriction accepted in pursuance of
any agreement shall be deemed to be contrary to the public interest
unless the Court is satisfied of any one or more of the following cir-
cumstances, that is to say-
(a) that the restriction is reasonably necessary, having regard
to the character of the goods to which it applies, to pro-
tect the public against injury (whether to persons or to
premises) in connection with the consumption, installa-
tion or use of those goods;
(b) that the removal of the restriction would deny to the pub-
lic as purchasers, consumers or users of any goods other
specific or substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed or
likely to be enjoyed by them as such, whether by virtue
of the restriction itself or of any arrangements or opera-
tions resulting therefrom;
(c) that the restriction is reasonably necessary to counteract
measures taken by any one person not party to the agree-
ment with a view to preventing or restricting competition
in or in relation to the trade or business in which the per-
sons party thereto are engaged;
(d) that the restriction is reasonably necessary to enable
the persons party to the agreement to negotiate fair terms
for the supply of goods to, or the acquisition of goods
from, any one person not party thereto who controls a
preponderant part of the trade or business of acquiring
or supplying such goods, or for the supply of goods to any
person not party to the agreement and not carrying on
such a trade or business who, either alone or in combina-
tion with any other such person, controls a preponderant
part of the market for such goods;(e) that, having regard to the conditions actually obtaining or
reasonably foreseen at the time of the application, the re-
moval of the restriction would be likely to have a serious
and persistent adverse effect on the general level of unem-
ployment in an area, or in areas taken together, in which
a substantial proportion of the trade or industry to which
the agreement relates is situated;
[Vol. 23
BRITISH RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES ACT
(f) that, having regard to the conditions actually obtaining
or reasonably foreseen at the time of the application, the
removal of the restriction would be likely to cause a re-
duction in the volume or earnings of the export business
which is substantial either in relation to the whole export
business of the United Kingdom or in relation to the
whole business (including export business) of the said
trade or industry; or
(g) that the restriction is reasonably required for purposes
connected with the maintenance of any other restriction
accepted by the parties, whether under the same agree-
ment or under any other agreement between them, being
a restriction which is found by the Court not to be con-
trary to the public interest upon grounds other than those
specified in this paragraph, or has been so found in previ-
ous proceedings before the Court,
and is further satisfied (in any such case) that the restriction is not
unreasonable having regard to the balance between those circum-
stances and any detriment to the public or to persons not party
to the agreement (being purchasers, consumers or users of goods
produced or sold by such parties, or persons engaged or seeking to
become engaged in the trade or business of selling such goods or of
producing or selling similar goods) resulting or likely to result
from the operation of the restriction.
DECISIONS OF THE RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES COURT
For clarity of exposition, the decisions of the court will be set
forth under four headings:
(a) Agreements relating to the fixing of prices for commodities;
(b) Agreements incorporating incentives to do business with
particular firms;
(c) Agreements imposing restrictions on selling outlets; and
(d) Agreements in fulfillment of a market sharing plan.
1. Agreements Relating to the Fixing of Prices for Commodities
The court has dealt with this category of restrictive practice
more than any other; fourteen of the eighteen cases so far decided
involved price fixing.
In Re Yarn Spinners' Agreement,7 3 the minimum price scheme
in existence in the cotton industry was alleged by its supporters to
confer specific and substantial benefits on the public under section
21 (1) (b) by keeping prices stable, by fostering modernisation within
the industry, by avoiding the consequences of a price war, by pre-
serving quality, by preventing the emergence of monopoly conditions
and also, under section 21(1)(f), by avoiding a substantial rise in
73 L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959).
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unemployment that would come about from the abrogation of the
agreement. The court found none of the benefits under sub-section
(1) (b) proved, and although it accepted the fact that the abrogation
of the agreement would have a persistent and adverse effect on the
level of unemployment, it found on balance that in the national interest
this consideration had to be outweighed. To the fore in the court's
thinking was the impression that what the industry needed most was
compactness. Only, they said, if the industry were made more compact
would prices fall and would the industry be able to resist foreign
competition. Since the announcement of this epoch-making decision,
the Government has been helping the industry to eliminate its excess
capacity. The problems in this industry remain, for the Government,
out of consideration for the economies of places like Hong Kong, has
indicated its unwillingness to use the tariff to protect the home cotton
industry. Thankfully, events have shown that the court's fears over
unemployment were somewhat exaggerated.
In Re Blanket Manufacturers' Agreement,74 the court was faced
with yet another minimum price agreement. The unique feature of this
case was the fact that the scheme had never been put into operation;
the scheme was of the "stop-loss" variety, the idea being that the
scheme would only come into operation should the industry as a whole
experience a period of recession. The court found that the insuperable
difficulty facing those who wished to justify the agreement was two-
fold: first, the scheme related to too few of the products which the
blanket manufacturers made; and second, it was unlikely that in the
foreseeable future the kind of recession feared would actually mate-
rialise. The court, at the same time, did hold valid restrictions mutually
agreed as to the quality of certain blankets being manufactured.
In Re Wholesale and Retail Bakers of Scotland Association's
Agreement,75 where another operative price agreement was encoun-
tered, resort was had to the same arguments that were of no avail in
the Yarn Spinners' case. It was urged that the agreement preserved
price stability, prevented the emergence of a monopoly in the bread in-
dustry, prevented debasement in the quality of bread and fostered
co-operation amongst the members of the Scottish bread trade. The
court was singularly unimpressed, saying that there was no reason
why the fact of the steady demand for bread should make success in
the bread industry any more difficult should the restriction disappear.
Price stabilisation without more, the court emphasised, was not a
benefit.
74 L.R. 1 R.P. 271 (1959).
75 L.R. 1 R.P. 347 (1959).
[Vol. 23
BRITISH RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES ACT
Restrictive practices in the English bread industry-an industry
which, in contrast to the Scottish, is largely dominated by four manu-
facturers-were examined in Re Federation of Wholesale and Multiple
Bakers' (Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Agreement.76 This time
the price restriction was expressed in the form of recommended maxi-
mum prices; however, the court was inquisitive, investigated how the
restriction had in fact operated and concluded that the maximum
had been treated as a minimum. The court was particularly critical of
the formula which had been employed for arriving at the recommended
price. The restriction was found to infringe section 21.
The aim of the restrictions in Re Federation of British Carpet
Manufacturers' Agreement77 was to fix prices on a certain range of
carpets; the association sought to justify them on the basis that quality
was preserved, price stability was maintained, distribution of carpets
was steady and promotion costs were cut to a minimum. The court
found as facts that none of these benefits was proved and registered
its disapproval once more of the arbitrary manner in which a price
charged had been calculated and the level at which the price had been
set.
Two aspects of Re Phenol Producers' Agreement7s need to be set
forth. Apart from the usual arguments that abandonment of the price
restriction would lead to a reduction both in quality and in the regu-
larity of supplies, the phenol producers introduced a new argument.
They argued that abrogation of the agreement would force the price
of phenol so low that there would be such a loss of revenue to tar
producers that they would, in turn, seek to divert tar from distillation
for purposes of making phenol to use as a fuel for which profitable
sales could be obtained. The court was not convinced that diversion
would follow any reduction in price because there was conflicting ex-
pert opinion as to the suitability of tar for use as fuel, the market for
tar as a fuel would be uncertain whereas there was an assured market
for the products of tar distillation, and it is uncertain what price
tar would fetch as fuel-particularly in the face of competition from
oil and coal. The second point about this case is the reaction of the
court to the frank admission by an important witness called on behalf
of the industry that what was taken into account when prices were
fixed was what the trade would stand.
In Re Black Bolt and Nut Association's Agreement,79 the price
76 L.R. 1 R.P. 387 (1959).
77 L.R. 1 R.P. 472 (1959).
78 L.R. 2 R.P. 1 (1960).
70 L.R. 2 R.P. 50 (1960).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
restriction was upheld on the grounds that a specific and substantial
benefit accrued to the "public," in this instance the purchasers of bolts
and nuts, in the avoidance, through the system of agreed listed prices,
of their having to "go shopping" for the cheapest bolts and nuts amidst
the infinite number of varieties available. The court conducted an
examination into the state of this industry and came to the conclusion
that prices had been fixed at a reasonable level. However, they did
express concern at the unscientific manner in which the price was
calculated. The court took pains to stress the fact that its decision was
no carte blanche; should the manufacturers misbehave themselves
in the future, the Registrar would be at liberty to return to the court.
The prices which confectioners were recommended to charge in
respect of their confectionery and the recommendation itself were
examined in Re Wholesale Confectioners Alliance's Agreement." Here
the arguments adduced included the ones that the prohibition on cut-
ting prices made it more likely that confectionery would continue to
be sold in remote areas where the turnover was not large; that the
restriction avoided the disadvantage of having to "go shopping"; and
that one important corollary of the restriction was that it prevented
disputes in the trade between wholesalers and retailers by neutralising
any advantage one side might possess in the process of fixing prices.
The court found none of the points proved.
A more sophisticated form of agreement was brought to light in
Re Motor Vehicles Distribution Scheme Agreement.8' The background
to this case is important. Manufacturers of British motor cars con-
vened, after the illegalisation of collectively enforced resale price
maintenance by the 1956 Act, and arranged that each of their fran-
chised dealers was to be permitted to sell the cars made by any of the
group at the same rates advantageous to himself. The scheme required
its signatories to prescribe the retail prices of their cars and the
franchised dealers, in turn, had to meet certain not-very-onerous garage
standards. The court held that the entire scheme was an attempt to
enforce collectively resale price maintenance and was, therefore, for-
bidden. Dealing with substantive arguments put forward on behalf of
the scheme, the court said that neither the advantage of after-sales
service nor the maintenance of a nationwide network of distribution
outlets, both of which were said to be effected by the scheme, was
sufficient to justify the scheme's retention. After-sales service, the
court continued, was but a shadowy advantage which was certainly not
"substantial" and any reduction in distribution outlets would not re-
80 L.R. 2 R.P. 135 (1960).
81 L.R. 2 R.P. 173 (1960).
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sult in their becoming inadequate. The alleged difficulties that the
ascetic Scot might have in purchasing a modern car prompted this
sarcastic retort from Diplock, J.:
It must give considerable satisfaction to the lonely crofters of
the western highlands to know how often concern for their unique
conditions are relied upon in the Restrictive Practices Court to jus-
tify restrictions applicable to the whole of the United Kingdom.82
The second price fixing agreement to be upheld was that in Re
Cement Makers' Federation Agreement.83 In this case the court was,
for the first time, faced with an agreement between several parties to
deliver a commodity at the same price in any area; the federation, in
fact, operated a basing point system. The crucial finding by the court
was, that because of the greater security it afforded to their invest-
ment, the scheme enabled members to accept a lower return on their
capital than the minimum they would require and obtain under free
competition, and that, since in the long run in an expanding industry,
the price level under free competition would depend on the return
necessary to attract investment in new cement works, the scheme had
resulted in substantially lower overall prices of cement than would
prevail under competition. That difference in the level of overall prices
was a substantial benefit within section 21(1)(b) and was not out-
weighed by any detriments, as none were found.
In Re British Bottle Association's Agreement,8 4 Re Associated
Transformer Manufacturers' Agreement8" and Re Linoleum Manu-
facturers' Association's Agreement, 6 the court took a more orthodox
stand; the price restrictions in all three cases were declared contrary
to the public interest. An interesting feature of the British Bottle case
was the fact that the agreement was upset in face of a finding that
not only was the industry efficient but also its prices had been rea-
sonable. The last two decisions took into account arguments based on
section 21(1)(f), the "exports" clause. In the Transformer case, the
court dogmatically asserted that level tendering, a practice included in
the manufacturers' export agreement, was generally to be disapproved.
In the Linoleum case, the court was forced to concede that a reduction
in prices at home, consequent to the ending of the price agreement,
might provoke a foreign government to introduce tariff or even anti-
dumping legislation in order to check the supply of cheaper British
goods. However, in the instant case, they found that this was unlikely
82 Id. at 224.
83 L.R. 2 R.P. 241 (1961).
84 L.R. 2 R.P. 345 (1961).
85 L.R. 2 R.P. 295 (1961).
86 L.R. 2 R.P. 395 (1961).
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for the seemingly startling reason that the ending of the agreement
could not be expected to foreshadow a substantial lowering in the
price of linoleum.
This "return to orthodoxy" has been short-lived, for in the most
recent case to be decided, Re Permanent Magnet Association's Agree-
ment, 7 a third restrictive price agreement was sustained. The associa-
tion in this case had to defend a minimum price agreement; to do so
it did not urge the support of the agreement as such: it did not argue
the desirability and proof of price stability or the avoidance of any
alleged economic consequences of cut-price competition. Rather, it
argued that the system of technical co-operation-the members agreed
to pool patents, exchange technical information and join together in
research-was so important to the industry that, as it was likely that the
co-operation would end following the abrogation of the price agree-
ment, the price agreement must be allowed to stand. The court was
convinced by this argument, being clearly impressed by the achieve-
ments of the British magnet industry in the field of research. The
court held that technical co-operation had made available to the
public improved magnets from a wider field of manufacturers, gen-
erally more quickly and sometimes at lower prices than would other-
wise have been the case. Though the court admitted the possibility of
lower prices if there were no agreement, still it considered that this
detriment was outweighed by the benefit the public derived from the
continuation of technical co-operation. After these concessions to the
industry, it comes as somewhat of a surprise that the court found the
association's case under section 21(1)(f), the "exports" clause, not
made out.
2. Agreements Incorporating Incentives to do Business with Particular
Firms
What we have in mind here are discounts and rebates. Though
both have been encountered, there has been relatively little discussion
of their merits; one can only turn to the cases in which they have
been overturned to learn something of the background to the individual
decisions. In the Carpets case, where quantity discounts were invali-
dated, these had been made available only to listed wholesalers; these
wholesalers were the only persons who could sell certain types of
carpets. This restriction on selling outlets was ended also. In Black
Bolt and Nut, the quantity discounts given to large purchasers were
declared contrary to the public interest, the court saying shortly that
they were an attempt to create a preferred group of purchasers and,
therefore, bad. In the Motor Vehicles Distribution case, discounts
87 [1962] 1 Weekly L.R. 781; [1962] 2 All E.R. 775.
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given to the franchised dealers were held to be of no benefit; the
whole scheme in this case was tainted by the court's finding on resale
price maintenance. In Cement, aggregated rebates were held invalid,
and in Permanent Magnet, rebates were once more pronounced bad,
on the basis, this time, that they were not essential to the price agree-
ment, which the court found promoted technical co-operation.
For the sake of completeness, it should be made known that
in the Carpets case one of the features of the agreements which dis-
tressed the court was the restriction imposed on manufacturers who
wished to contract bulk sales or engage in direct selling. The court,
then, is not unequivocal on what it considers to be fair trading terms.
3. Agreements Imposing Restrictions on Selling Outlets
Restrictions of this type have been met in three cases; in all three
the court expressed its disapproval of these agreements by holding
them contrary to the public interest.
Re Chemists' Federation Agreements" involved an agreement be-
tween manufacturers of medicines, wholesalers and retail chemists to
the effect that only properly qualified retail chemists would have the
right to sell certain kinds of medicines. The category of medicines
was quite extensive and included "proprietary medicines." The argu-
ment presented was that the agreement sought to protect the public
by enabling it to have the benefit of a sale from a responsible person,
a benefit within section 21(1)(a) or (b). The court somewhat
skeptically replied that there was no guarantee that a chemist's as-
sistant was aware of possible dangers involved in the consumption of
certain limited types of proprietary medicines. The argument that
the agreement helped to keep in business the small village chemist
was dismissed, largely on the insufficiency of the evidence.
In the Carpets case, as has already been noted, the system in-
volving a limitation on the number of sellers of carpets of a particular
type incurred the disapproval of the court; the court was particularly
annoyed by the arbitrariness of the method by which new carpet sellers
were selected.
Similar considerations were scarcely revealed in Re Newspaper
Proprietors' Association Ltd.'s and National Federation of Retail
Newsagents, Booksellers and Stationers' Agreement; '9 still this restric-
tion on retail selling outlets for London daily newspapers, including
such unlikely bedfellows as the "Financial Times" and the "Grey-
hound Express and Coursing News," was upset. The retailers argued
that without the agreement there would be such an influx of new-
88 L.R. 1 R.P. 75 (1958).
89 L.R. 2 R.P. 453 (1961).
1962]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
comers into the business that existing newsagents, in order to compete
more effectively, would have to curtail delivery services or cease
stocking a quality newspaper such as "The Times" which appeared on
many newsagents' display stands simply to catch a casual purchaser.
The defense was divided, as appeared from the proprietors' argument.
They insisted that without the agreement the federation would some-
how manage to make entry into the newspaper retail business even
more hazardous. The court extricated itself from the difficulties set
in its path by a divided opposition in the following fashion. Dealing
first with the retailers, the court came to the conclusion that any sub-
stantial increase following the abandonment of the agreement in the
numbers of retailers was not to be expected, because entry was
particularly hard. Newsagency did not pay unless a newsagent built
up a delivery service, which was not easily achieved. The court dis-
missed the contention of the proprietors on the ground that it was
not to be expected that the federation and their retail members would
breach the Act. This expectation was somewhat dimmed by later
developments."
4. Agreements in Fulfillment of a Market Sharing Plan
We have already had occasion to refer to a level tendering ar-
rangement in the Transformers case; two other cases more clearly
illustrate the court's technique.
In Re Water-Tube Boilermakers' Agreement,91 the manufacturers
operated a collusive tendering system by arranging who was to receive
any contract that was about to be awarded. The "collusion" aspect of
this case was never emphasised although the court did stress the im-
portance of co-operation between the various members of the industry,
especially since so few large boilers were ever bought and research
always needed to be kept up to date. Nevertheless, the court was not
prepared to sustain the restriction on this basis, nor was it of the
opinion that the scheme was necessary in order to negotiate fair terms
with a preponderant buyer which would have been a defense provided
by section 2 1(1) (d). Instead, the court found that in the important
export trade, it was vital that as many personnel and offices as possible
be maintained abroad, and that this, in fact, was the present situation
because of the spirit of co-operation in the industry. Therefore, the
system of collusive tendering was not contrary to the public interest.
A territorial dividing device accepted by two co-operative societies
was pronounced to be against the public interest in Re Doncaster and
90 See text supra, accompanying note 67.
91 L.R. 1 R.P. 285 (1959).
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Retford Co-operative Societies' Agreement. 2 This decision was based
primarily on the grounds that the possibility of overlapping of services
or the establishment of competing shops was too remote, the result
being that no substantial benefit was conferred on the public.
A CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S PERFORMANCE
Most people have been impressed by the strong line which the
court has, in its eighteen decisions to date, taken on restrictive
practices. Some critics' enthusiasm, however, is tempered by their
concern over the four cases-Water-Tube Boilermakers, Black Bolt
and Nut, Cement, and Permanent Magnet-in which restrictions
received the imprimaturs of the court. To a foreign observer, partic-
ularly an American who is immersed in the study of his own antitrust
laws, the four concessions that the court has made to restrictive
practices may appear hard to understand. It is now that the purpose
of the long introduction to this article should be made known: the aim
was a spiritual cleansing, an assertion of the need to examine one's own
assumptions in the light of the experiences of others. Concern over the
export trade, the need to promote investment and to continue research,
and acquiescence in convenience-the four dominant features in
Water-Tube Boilermakers, Cement, Permanent Magnet, and Black
Bolt and Nut respectively-are four varieties of the countervailing
social and economic policies we did so much to emphasise at an earlier
stage might soften any rigorous pro-"competition" and anti-"restriction"
drive by the court. In the four above-mentioned cases, there was not
so much a lapse on the part of the court from the standard norm as a
not unexpected avowal93 of factors other than "competition" that may
solve the equation set by the ideal of economic health. The final refusal
in Yarn Spinners to take into account the prospect of unemployment
simply indicates that, as the equations set by our ideal are not the same
in every branch of industry, the dividing factors cannot be expected to
be the same.
The contrast between Yarn Spinners and Black Bolt and Nut is
remarkable. In the latter case, merely the avoidance of an incon-
venience was deemed to be sufficient to save the agreement, whilst in
the former, an increase in unemployment with its consequent disloca-
tion of the economy and human beings was not. However much one
may feel that the court in both cases eventually chose the right
factors of economic health, it would be wrong not to examine the
view that the absence in the legislation of any guide as to the weight to
be given to arguments, when these are balanced under section 21, is
unfortunate. All the more so, since few would nowadays contend that
92 L.R. 2 R-P. 105 (1960).
03 Whether the four occasions were suitable for this avowal is a matter fit for debate.
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pain and pleasure can be scientifically measured, so absurd has
Bentham's felicific calculus been shown to be.
Section 21 provides the skeptic with a ready target. He may urge
that the decisions are solely instances of quot homines, tot sententiae;
that if consistency among the decisions has occurred, either it has been
more apparent than real or more fortuitous than planned. In a sense,
these criticisms are well aimed. Consider, for instance, the relationship of
the first clause of section 21(1) to section 21(1) (b), the "specific and
substantial benefits" clause. The first clause seems to ban all restrictive
practices; the second may permit them to enjoy legal immunity if they
receive a broad enough interpretation.
Again, it is not easy to evaluate the presumption against restrictive
practices contained in the first few lines of section 21. Does the
presumption truly make it difficult for defendants to discharge their
onus of proof, or is the presumption simply a portion of the framework
which is designed to set defendants at a disadvantage but one which is
not insuperable? Could it be said that in the Cement case, Diplock, J.,
the then President of the court, viewed the extent of the "adverse
presumption" clause more benignly than did Devlin, J., when he was
presiding over the court in Yarn Spinners, or Russell, J., in the British
Bottle case?
At the heart of these difficulties surrounding section 21 lies the
significance of the whole Act. The puzzle is tangled and there are many
possible methods to attack it. The one selected here is suggested by
the belief that a large proportion of our difficulties is caused by our
incapacity to assess the effect on the outcome of each individual case
of whatever guidance the court is afforded by section 21. This is a
field of inquiry in which "realists" and "positivists" have vested
interests; we will utilise the evidence both could derive from an
acquaintance with the Act and the decisions reached thereunder.
The "realist," in arguing that the Act gives virtually complete
discretion to the court and that the cases demonstrate this, could
construct a case in support of his view thus:
"The decisions demonstrate the reluctance-one might term it the
inability-of the court to abandon a largely intuitive approach. The
problems with which this court is concerned demand a thoroughgoing
knowledge on the part of the judges of the health or otherwise of a
whole industry, and it is inconceivable that during this stage of
acquiring knowledge, pre-conceptions are not formed which ultimately
influence the outcome. In Yarn Spinners, a substantial proportion of the
lengthy judgment is devoted to an evaluation of the state of the in-
dustry; one does not have to read long before one comes to the point
where the view is propounded in blunt fashion that the industry should
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be made more compact. 94 Hence, the adverse decision. Only a fool would
deny the impact that the words and deeds of businessmen have had on
the court. In both Black Bolt and Nut and Cement, the court states
how impressed it was by the marked responsibility shown by the
members of the two industries, and in Permanent Magnet, praise was
showered on the industry's accomplishments in the field of research. As
an example of a case where the court's assessments were of a different
variety one need only recall the reaction in Phenol to the frank admis-
sion on the part of one of the witnesses that the criterion for fixing the
price was what the trade would bear. Furthermore, the tribunal itself
has shown awareness of the cardinal importance of the history of the
conduct of an industry in the past." Even admitting that what the
court does inquire into is in compliance with the spirit of section 21, one
cannot state that that 'spirit' dictates the orientation of the inquiry.
Is not the orientation affected simply by vague notions of hostility and
the intuitive common-sense of both the lay and the judicial members
of the court?"
The "positivist" might reply:
"No one will deny that the Act leaves considerable discretion to
the judges and encourages them to pursue their inquiries into each
industry much as they wish; but, nevertheless, these freedoms are
limited. In the first place, there is written into section 21 a clear
hostility towards restrictive practices; benefits alleged to follow from
the operation of restrictions have got to be proved and the burden of
proof is a heavy one. The fact of the non-operation of the scheme in
the Blankets case logically entailed that the scheme be struck down;
for if it had never operated, how could it truly be said it conferred
benefits? And note that in the British Bottle case the findings that
the industry was efficient and that its prices had been reasonable were
not sufficient to save the price restriction. In the second instance, the
fact that the court has, in some cases, decided that defendants have not
proved the existence of any benefits (and has, therefore, not had to
concern itself with the Registrar's list of supposed detriments) whilst,
in other cases, the court has not so chosen to confine its activities,
requires an explanation. Does this difference not suggest that the court
does adhere to a set of economic values, and, however inadequately
these may be formulated, they do, in the court's view, exist?"
Rather than examine these opposing viewpoints, both of which,
it is submitted, contain evidence in their favor, it is now proposed that
we conclude by attempting to reduce to a set of propositions the cur-
94 L.R. 1 R.P. 118, 184 (1959).
95 See the Cement case, supra note 83, at 276, and the Permanent Magnet case, supra
note 87, at 800.
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rent state of the law. Even here it should be apparent that our
hypothetical debate has not been irrelevant.
(1) The general hostility shown to agreements incorporating
restrictions both on outlets and markets suggests that the task con-
fronting anyone who wishes to defend either variety of restriction is
almost insurmountable. The facts, as found, in one case involving
market sharing, Water-Tube Boilermakers, must be deemed somewhat
exceptional.
(2) There is a general presumption against the validity of
restrictive price agreements. However, if inefficiency does not exist in
the particular industry; 96 if the price charged is reasonable97 and
preferably fixed scientifically" and independently;" 9 if the respon-
sibility of the leaders of the industry in the past is likely to continue;100
and, furthermore,'"' assuming that the price agreement has been in
operation," 2 if that agreement additionally appeals to the court by
virtue of some special benefit which the public derives from it; 0 3
then the agreement may escape the censure of the court.
(3) The propositions outlined above must be qualified by the
possibilities that the economic attitudes of the judges do differ, that
awareness of the difference of the problems in a sector where oligopoly
prevails in contrast to a sector where it does not has already and will
continue to affect decisions, and, finally, that the variations in the
respect shown to competitive aggressiveness and individuality are not
consistent with the above analysis.
It should by now be clear that the question, What is the force of
the British Restrictive Trade Practices Act?, admits of no short or
simple answer. Our task will have been achieved if we have managed
to narrow the range of our inquiry, and yet, at the same time, have
broadened our vision.
96 As was not the case in, for example, Yarn Spinners.
o As it was found to be in Black Bolt and Nut and Cement and not to be in Phenol.
98 The price was not fixed scientifically either in Black Bolt and Nnt or Permanent
Magnet. Still, this deficiency was not fatal. Note the words of Mocatta, J., in the
Permanent Magnet case, supra note 95, at 813:
Our concern ... is with the reasonableness. of the prices charged to the public,
whether arrived at by accident or design.
99 As it was, for example, in Cement.
100 This point was stressed in all three cases where restrictions were upheld. Both
the "specific and substantial benefits" clause and the final balancing clause of section
21(1) invite this consideration of the future.
1I In British Bottle the agreement was upset although efficiency, reasonableness
of price and industrial responsibility could all be said to have been proved.
102 In the Blanket case, it will be remembered, the scheme was invalidated, although
it was found to be not unreasonable, simply because it had never operated.
103 Such as an incentive to greater investment (Cement) or the high quality of
research (Permanent Magnet).
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POSTSCRIPT
Since the draft of this article was prepared, two more decisions
relating to price restrictions have been handed down by the court. Both
decisions were in favor of the restrictive agreements concerned and
appear to support the thesis advanced above that the social interests
taken into consideration by the court are considerably broader than a
superficial acquaintance with the legislation might suggest as being
possible. Once more 'the validation of restrictions has been accom-
plished by means of the application of subsection (b) of section 21 (1).
In Re Standard Metal Window Group's Agreement,'14 the court
sustained an agreed minimum delivered price for standard metal
window frames. This agreement had been entered into by the manu-
facturers responsible for 42 per cent of the national production of such
frames. Competition from the other metal window frame manufacturers
as well as from the manufacturers of wooden window frames was
interpreted as preventing any kind of economic manipulation by the
parties to the agreement. In fact the court found that prices agreed
by the parties were lower than those that would obtain were the
restriction removed. The court was thus impressed by the argument
of the need of the parties to exchange detailed costing and technical
information and since, in the court's opinion, the continuation of this
exchange was dependent on the price restrictions, the restrictions were
permitted to continue.
In Re Net Book Agreement,' the court vindicated an agreement
between book publishers in Britain to enforce certain minimum prices
for their books. The court found that were this "net book agreement"
ended, the number of stockholding bookshops, "the aristocrats of the
trade"-Blackwell's of Oxford or Thin's of Edinburgh come to mind-
would decline, and the amount of stock held would be less than at
present. The court was also of the opinion that, though in a few
particular cases prices of books would be lower because of price cutting,
the general effect of abrogation of the agreement would be to increase
the price of books to the public. A third major finding was that fewer
books would be published under competitive conditions. Commented
Buckley, J., "There may not be many mute inglorious Miltons about,"",
but if the agreement was ended, there would be more chance of them
remaining mute."
104 [1962] 1 Weekly L.R. 1020; [1962] 3 All E.R. 210.
105 The Times (London), Oct. 31, 1962.
106 The reference is to a passage in Thomas Gray's "Elegy Written in a Country
Churchyard":
Some village-Hampden, that with dauntless breast
The little tyrant of his fields withstood;
Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest,
Some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood.
